CSE 190_A Home Page

Note new due date for assn3: due 6/6 11:59pm. The final is now available [also PDF]; it is due on 6/11 10:00pm.

Final Exam Clarifications:

big_int mod_exp(big_int b, big_int e, big_int m)
{
	int i;
	big_int y;
	big_int x = b;	/* OMITTED EARLIER */

	for (i = 0, y = 1; i < MAXBITS && e != 0; i++, x = mod_mult(x,x,m), e = e / 2)
		if ((e % 2) == 1) y = mod_mult(y,x,m);
	return y;
}

The initial handout is available in postscript [PDF].

Homework / Projects

1. due 4/7. Write a threat model/assessment for your home. Give the assets to be protected, attacks and skill levels involved, etc as we discussed in class. To alleviate confidentiality concerns, you don't have to exhaustively list your assets -- you may substitute parts with assets with similar security requirements. Turn it in by email.
2. due 4/19 before class. Attack the given program. Make sure that it works on ieng9. In your write-up, describe what you had to do, why it was needed for the attack to succeed, and describe any tools that you had to create to mount the attack. Also give detailed instructions on how to use your attack tools so that I can verify that things work in my own environment. Your tools may depend on the test program's output.

   You should turn in the write-up along with all of your source code. Do not include the original assn2.c source code, any executables, or binary data. Turn in the assignment by the turnin program.

3. due 6/4 11:59pm. Identify security weaknesses and attack this RPC system (orig). (You may attack either the original version or the updated one; identify which in your write-up.) The client/server code provided shows how this simple RPC system is used. You must modify the client so that the server -- code unchanged -- can be made to print "Hello world" to its standard output. Your attack code must work in the Solaris environment. To run the client side, you'll need the net_redir program as well.

   A list of preliminary bugs (accidentally released) is here. If you got the earlier version of the tar file, you should modify the Makefile to include -lsocket.

   Your write-up should include an exhaustive list of the security vulnerabilities and design flaws, and describe in detail how you mounted your attack.

   Your Makefile (for Solaris) should include the line

   CFLAGS=-DDOUBLE_BYTE_ORDER=1 -DUSE_SIGSET
   

   as well as the -lsocket -lnsl for the final linking step. Also, change the uses of mcopy in rpc.c to memcpy.

   For those of you who are confused about the use of net_redir, you compile it by:

   cc -o net_redir net_redir.c -lsocket -lnsl
   

   (The -lsocket -lnsl is needed only on Solaris.) And you run the server as:

   % ./server -p 6789 -v
   

   in one window on a Solaris machine, say named ieng9, and then in another window -- on any machine, as long as you have compiled the client with the right byte-ordering conditional compilation directives -- you run the client as:

   % ./net_redir -s 6789@ieng9 -d 3 -- ./client -v
   

   The number 6789 in both the server and the client command lines is the TCP port number at which the service is located. (The -s flag allows you to use service names found in /etc/services as well.) The number that you use doesn't have to be 6789 -- as a matter of fact, since the server will fail to acquire that port number if somebody is already using it, you should probably chose your own. The only restriction other than its being unused is that it must also be above 1000, which on Unix systems are reserved for use by system services.

   There are some uape machines configured so that the stack segment is not executable. This is very rare. To verify that the machine you're using permits execution from the stack, run ~/../public/stack_test. If it dumps core, then it doesn't allow execution from the stack; if it outputs a message, then you're okay.

Reading Assignments

1. Scan through the Orange book (DOD 5200.28-STD, 85) (earlier version (CSC-STD-00l-83) also available) and a summary of the differences between it and DoD Standard 5200.28. The Orange Book is the classical specification of multi-level security, and deals with trusted computing bases, trusted paths, data labelling, etc. Aka TCSEC.
2. Thompson's 1984 Turing Award Lecture, Reflections on Trusting Trust. A true classic.
3. The Protection of Information in Computer Systems (Q&A on May 10, to be continued on May 12)
4. Software Fault Isolation paper. (Q&A on May 17) (check out an hopefully fixed version with a better page 7 / figure 4, at least when previewing with gv/ghostview; you may also want to look at page 7 by itself)
5. The Design and Implementation of Tripwire (Q&A on May 19) (PDF)
6. Building Diverse Computer Systems (Q&A on May 24) (PDF)
7. Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite (Q&A on May 26) (PDF)
8. Useability of Security (Q&A on June 2) (PDF)

Security Related News / Current Events

NASA plagued by security problems

infosec: UK MI-6 secret agents list disclosed

infosecurity asia, a trade show in Singapore, has a contest to break into ``secure'' web servers, with monetary prizes.

Microsoft to build Unix email client due to Army's message-security concerns

Hackers attack U.S. government web sites in protest of bombing of Chinese embassy

DOE orders all computer work halted at three nuclear weapons labs due to possible computer security lapses. Note the quote

But John C. Browne, lab director at Los Alamos, cautioned that the labs cannot allow security to become so stringent that it prevents them from accomplishing their objectives. "We have to look at threats to information security from a risk-benefit standpoint and put in place additional procedures that make sense," he said. "We can't raise the bar so high we can't get any work done. That affects national security too."

article on SSN privacy at CNN

Deja news privacy snafu

Bennet maintains a list of Web resources relating to computer security, ranging from cryptography resources, system security testing tools, to word compilations useful in eliminating easy-to-guess passwords.

bsy+cse190a@cs.ucsd.edu, last updated Fri Jun 4 15:08:30 PDT 1999.